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I. INTRODUCTION

Punitive damages are “exotic” in a civil law system,1 and the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on conflict of laws may be acting as a
Trojan Horse,2 sneaking punitive damages into Louisiana’s civil
law.3 Although Louisiana claims to have a strong legislative policy
Copyright 2013, by BROOKSIE L. BONVILLAIN.
1. Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887).
2. The Louisiana Legislature’s debate of Senate Bill 646 proposing the
codification of Louisiana’s choice-of-law provisions during the 1990 Legislative
Session raised the concern that the articles could be the “[T]rojan [H]orse”
introducing punitive damages into Louisiana law. Letter from Symeon Symeonides,
Committee Reporter, Louisiana State Law Institute Conflicts Projet, to the Louisiana
State Law Institute Conflicts Projet Committee (Dec. 19, 1990) (on file with the
Louisiana State Law Institute).
3. Louisiana does allow punitive damages in limited statutory exceptions.
See infra Part II.A.2.
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against punitive damages,4 these articles enable courts to apply
punitive damages laws from other jurisdictions in damages awards
granted in Louisiana.5 When presented with this issue in Arabie v.
CITGO Petroleum Corp.,6 the Louisiana Supreme Court reached the
correct result; however, the lower courts’ analyses7 show how
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws articles can be misapplied to sneak
punitive damages into Louisiana in similar claims that are still being
tried.8 Such awards generate concerns over inconsistent codal
interpretation, forum shopping, substantive and procedural clashes,
and corporate exposure to damages above and beyond what
Louisiana’s substantive law would typically allow.9 This Trojan
Horse creates the need for legislative clarification of the interaction
among the conflict-of-laws articles governing punitive damages in
order to align awards of punitive damages in Louisiana in
accordance with legislative intent.10
This Comment explains why there is a need to reform Louisiana
law governing multistate tort conflicts. The Louisiana Legislature
needs to amend the conflict-of-laws articles to limit situations in
which courts may award punitive damages outside of Louisiana’s
statutory exceptions.11 Accordingly, Part II of this Comment
summarizes Louisiana’s punitive damages and conflict-of-laws
provisions and compares Louisiana’s provisions to that of other
jurisdictions.12 Part III then traces the path established by Arabie v.
CITGO Petroleum Corp., highlighting the flawed analysis at all
three levels of litigation.13 Finally, Part IV analyzes the Louisiana
courts’ decision-making processes and underlying motives for
awarding punitive damages and then offers a legislative solution to

4. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn, 409 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. La.
1976); Karavokiros v. Ind. Motor Bus Co., 524 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. La. 1981); see
also Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012).
5. See infra Parts II.B.2, IV.A−B.
6. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307; Arabie v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529
(La. Ct. App. 2010).
7. See Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307; Arabie, 49 So. 3d 529.
8. See Evans v. TIN, Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–
2348, 11–2351, 11–2417, 11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–
3048, 11–3049, 12–18, 11–3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012);
infra Part V.A.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part IV.B.
11. See infra Parts IV.A.2, V.B.
12. See infra Part II.
13. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); Arabie v.
CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010). See infra Part IV.
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the flawed articles on the conflict of laws to definitively close the
door to punitive damages.14
II. OPENING THE DOOR TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A COMPARATIVE
OVERVIEW OF LOUISIANA LAW
Louisiana purports to have a strong legislative policy against
awarding punitive damages, except in limited statutorily excepted
situations.15 The history of Louisiana’s policy on punitive damages is
instructive because the courts and the Louisiana Legislature have
disagreed on the legislative intent behind punitive damages over the
past century.16 This overview details the codification of Louisiana’s
conflict-of-laws provisions and compares Louisiana’s approach to
those of other jurisdictions, paying particular attention to the
treatment of punitive damages.17 Louisiana’s legislative policy
restricting punitive damages is unique, and it should be preserved
from erosion through codal loopholes that open the door to the
inappropriate award of punitive damages under the law of foreign
jurisdictions.
A. Louisiana Law on Punitive Damages
Louisiana traditionally disfavors the award of punitive
damages.18 This is a minority position on punitive damages among
American states,19 as this policy is rooted in the civil law rather than
the common law.20 In the civil law, an award of damages is meant to
“repair the harm sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to
punish the wrongdoer.”21 Accordingly, as a civilian jurisdiction,
Louisiana has “been reluctant to open its doors” to allow the
recovery of punitive damages.22
14. See infra Part V.
15. See generally John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana
Punitive Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579 (2010).
16. See generally id. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See generally deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15.
19. See infra note 28.
20. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 579.
21. See id. at 580 (citing SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 7.6, in 6
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 205 (2d ed. 1999)); see also 2 LINDA L.
SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 22.2 (5th ed. 2005); John Y. Gotanda, Punitive
Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 396–98
(2004).
22. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 580 (citing LITVINOFF,
supra note 21, at 198); see also Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages–A European
Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741 (2008).
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1. The Louisiana Supreme Court: Closing the Door to Punitive
Damages
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 was silent on punitive
damages.23 The courts awarded punitive damages without a
statutory basis in ten reported decisions from 1836 to 1917.24 These
unsupported awards spurred the desire for a statutory basis to justify
awards of punitive damages, and Louisiana courts argued the issue
of punitive damages for many years.25 In 1917, the Louisiana
Supreme Court finally laid the issue to rest in Vincent v. Morgan’s
Louisiana26 by holding that “pecuniary penalties imposed as
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages” were not recoverable
under Louisiana law.27
2. The Louisiana Civil Code: Cracking the Door to Punitive
Damages
After Vincent, the Legislature enacted three narrow statutory
exceptions permitting awards of punitive damages, and this is the
current state of Louisiana law on the subject.28 Still, Louisiana’s
policy is far more restrictive than the majority of states that allow
23. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 583; see also Patrick J.
Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of Laws, 70 LA.
L. REV. 529 (2010).
24. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 583 n.30 (citing and
discussing some of those cases (Casper v. Prosdame, 14 So. 317 (La. 1894);
McFee v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pac. R.R. Co., 7 So. 720, 722–23 (La. 1890);
Rutherford v. Shreveport & Houston R.R. Co., 6 So. 644, 644 (La. 1889);
Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887); Hill v. New Orleans, Opelousas &
Great W. R.R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 292, 294 (La. 1855); Varillat v. New Orleans &
Carrollton R.R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 88 (La. 1855); Black v. Carrollton R.R. Co., 10
La. Ann. 33, 38 (La. 1855); Grant v. McDonogh, 7 La. Ann. 447, 448 (La. 1852);
McGary v. City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440, 440 (La. 1849); Summers v.
Baumgard, 9 La. 161, 162 (1836).)); see also Adams v. J.E. Merit Constr., Inc.,
712 So. 2d 88, 90–91 (La. 1998).
25. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 583. The courts began
citing article 2324.1 as a justification for punitive damages to allow the judge or
the jury to have discretion over the award of punitive damages in the absence of a
statutory basis, but there was no specific basis for punitive damages in this article.
Id. Current article 2324.1 appeared as article 1928 in the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825. Id. at n.31. Those decisions, which allowed the award of punitive damages,
admitted that punitive damages have common law roots and described punitive
damages as “exotic” in a civil law system. Id. at 581 n.12. The dissents in those
decisions refuted punitive damages because they are against civil law tradition. Id.
26. Vincent v. Morgan’s La., 74 So. 541 (La. 1917).
27. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 585 (citing Vincent, 74
So. at 549).
28. See id.; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7 (2013).
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punitive damages.29 This strict limitation is rooted “in the protection
of [Louisiana’s] judicial system . . . from what it might consider
inherently speculative awards.”30
Unless specific statutory authority to award punitive damages
exists, Louisiana only allows the award of compensatory damages in
tort cases.31 Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code sets forth
general delictual liability for “[e]very act whatever of man that
causes damage to another.”32 Damages awarded for delictual
conduct under article 2315 are strictly limited to general damages
and special damages, which include “loss of consortium, service,
and society” and costs “directly related to a manifest physical or
mental injury or disease.”33 These narrow bases for damages reflect
the civilian goal of remedying wrongs, without punishing the
wrongdoer.34
However, three articles allow additional exemplary damages for
statutorily excepted tortious conduct.35 Specifically, these articles
only allow exemplary damages for exceptionally egregious torts,
which are limited to child pornography, operation of a motor vehicle
while intoxicated, and criminal sexual activity with a child.36
Exemplary damages are synonymous with punitive damages, as they
are meant to make an example out of the defendant for delictual
conduct37 and may only be awarded upon proof of a heightened
29. ROBERT W. HAMMESFAHR & LORI S. NUGENT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A
STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.3, at 266–68 (2011). From a
national perspective, states have three major variations on punitive damages,
which in turn affect the choice-of-law analysis for multistate tort conflicts. First,
four states generally disallow punitive damages. Borchers, supra note 23, at 531.
Second, Louisiana and Massachusetts disallow punitive damages but provide
exceptions for specific, statutorily excepted conduct. Id. Third, the remaining
states, including Louisiana’s neighbors, allow punitive damages. Id. These states
allow punitive damages as a matter of common law. See HAMMESFAHR &
NUGENT, supra, at 266−68.
30. Pitmann v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 559 So. 2d 879 (La. Ct. App.
1990). Accord Lee v. Ford Motor Co., 457 So. 2d 193, 194−95 (La. Ct. App.
1984). The Louisiana Civil Code provisions that make exceptions to allow the
award of punitive damages mirror common law analytical techniques that import
the framework for these awards. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at
579.
31. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 with id. arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7.
32. Art. 2315.
33. Id.
34. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 580 (citing LITVINOFF,
supra note 21); see also SCHLUETER, supra note 21; Gotanda, supra note 21, at
396−98.
35. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7.
36. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7.
37. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 588.
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standard of liability.38 The limited circumstances in which punitive
damages may be recovered and the heightened standard of liability
required for recovery further illustrate the Legislature’s intent to
limit such awards.39
Louisiana reaffirmed its policy against punitive damages in 1996
when the Legislature repealed article 2315.3, a fourth statutory
exception, which allowed “punitive damages in matters involving
transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.”40 The repeal of
article 2315.3 is also important to the treatment of cases asserting
claims for punitive damages for delictual conduct involving
hazardous or toxic substances, such as cases involving refinery spills
like in Arabie.41 There is no longer a statutory exception for the
award of punitive damages in this situation, leading plaintiffs to seek
other authority for such awards.42 Consequently, some plaintiffs
have turned to the codal provisions on conflict of laws as a
substitute.
B. Louisiana Law on Conflict of Laws
In addition to lacking authorization for punitive damages, the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 was also silent on choice-of-law in
multistate tort cases.43 Initially, Louisiana courts adjudged multistate
38. Articles 2315.3, 2315.4, and 2315.7 set the heightened standard of
liability at “a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety” of the person
or others. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7.
39. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7.
40. Philip Ackerman, Some Don’t Like it Hot: Louisiana Eliminates Punitive
Damages for Environmental Torts, 72 TUL. L. REV. 327, 327 (1997);
HAMMESFAHR & NUGENT, supra note 29, at 395–96. The Legislature repealed
article 2315.3 to counteract the Louisiana Supreme Court’s judicial expansion of
article 2315.3 in the Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co. case. See id. at 383 (citing Billiot v.
B.P. Oil Co., 645 So.2d 604 (La. 1994) (overruled by Adams v. Merit Constr.,
Inc., 712 So. 2d 88 (La. 1998) and Act No. 432, 1995 La. Acts 1622)). The Billiot
Court held that “an employee could seek punitive damages against an employer
even though the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Statute provided employers
with tort immunity.” See HAMMESFAHR & NUGENT, supra note 29, at 395–96
(citing Billiot, 645 So. 2d 604). This created a loophole for employees to sue their
employers, who were immune from compensatory damages, for punitive damages
instead. Id. While article 2315.3 was also repealed for reasons such as preserving
the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Statute and other political pressures, it
nonetheless further restricted punitive damages recovery in Louisiana.
41. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); infra
Part III.
42. This is particularly important for the purposes of this Comment because
article 2315.3 formerly applied to refinery spills like the one in Arabie. Id.
43. Symeon Symeonides, Introductory Note: The State of Present Louisiana
Jurisprudence 59 (July 2, 1989) (unpublished comment) (on file with the
Louisiana State Law Institute).
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torts by following the approach of other states under the rule of lex
loci delicti, which dictates that the law of the place where the tort
occurred should govern a rule of decision in a tort case.44 The rule of
lex loci delicti fell under attack during the American conflicts
revolution of the 1960s, and many jurisdictions denounced the rule.45
Louisiana followed suit in 1973 when the Louisiana Supreme Court
judicially abandoned the rule in Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.46 After
Jagers, the place where the tort occurred no longer necessarily
controlled which law applied.47 The Jagers Court clearly denounced
the lex loci delicti rule but failed to provide a suitable replacement.48
Without a clear rule to follow, Louisiana lower courts applied a
variety of inconsistent methods.49 The Louisiana State Law Institute
undertook the task of creating a uniform body of law to streamline the
various approaches.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
47. See Symeonides, supra note 43, at 59. In Jagers v. Royal Indemnity Co.,
the Louisiana Supreme Court chose not to apply the rule of lex loci delicti. Id.
(citing Jagers, 276 So. 2d 309); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana’s
New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677,
681 n.17 (1992). See generally Harvey Couch, Choice-of-Law, Guest Statutes, and
the Louisiana Supreme Court: Six Judges in Search of a Rulebook, 45 TUL. L.
REV. 100 (1970) (offering insight into how the Court chose to abandon the lex loci
delicti rule). Jagers arose from a car accident in Mississippi between two
Louisiana family members. See Symeonides, supra note 43, at 59 (citing Jagers,
276 So. 2d 309). Because Mississippi “had no interest” in applying its law to the
particular issue of whether Louisiana family members could sue one another in
tort, the Court refused to apply Mississippi law under the rule of lex loci delicti. Id.
Mississippi law would have disallowed the suit through intra-family immunity. Id.
The Court instead applied Louisiana law because Louisiana’s policy of
compensation would have been affected if the court did not apply it to protect the
Louisiana domiciliary, although the injury occurred in Mississippi. Id. Because the
case did not involve a Mississippi family, Mississippi’s policy of protecting
families from discourse would not be affected. Id. The Jagers Court considered
the case to be a “false conflict” because only one of the states involved, Louisiana,
truly “had an interest” in applying its own law. Id. A “true conflict” would be a
case in which both states are interested in applying their law. Id.
48. See Symeonides, supra note 43, at 59 (citing Jagers, 276 So. 2d 309).
49. See id. at 59−60. Louisiana lower courts applied three methods of
reasoning to reconcile multistate torts conflicts: (1) the government interest
analysis, (2) the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws approach, and (3) a
combination of the two methods. Id. See also James J. Hautot, Choice of Law in
Louisiana: Torts, 47 LA. L. REV. 1109 (1987). Compare Sutton v. Langley, 330
So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (government interest analysis), with Cooper v.
American Express Co., 593 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1979) (the Restatement Second of
Conflict of Laws analysis), Brinkley & West Inc., v. Foremost Ins. Co., 499 F.2d
928 (5th Cir. 1974), and Ardoyno v. Kyzar, 426 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. La. 1976) (a
combination of the two methods).
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1. Building the Trojan Horse: The Louisiana State Law
Institute’s Projet
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws codification was “the first
comprehensive attempt at conflicts codification in the United
States.”50 When the Louisiana State Law Institute prepared the
Projet for the Codification of Louisiana Law of Conflict of Laws,51 it
submitted its proposal of 36 new Louisiana Civil Code articles to the
1990 Regular Legislative Session.52 During the course of debate in
the Louisiana House of Representatives, the tort articles were the
most controversial.53 Concern arose that the Projet “might open the
doors to obnoxious foreign laws . . . [and] be the ‘[T]rojan [H]orse’
for the introduction of punitive damages to Louisiana.”54 Due to its
concerns, the House deferred the conflicts Projet and recommended
the addition of an article that would allow Louisiana courts to refuse
foreign law if it “would produce a result that is repugnant to
Louisiana’s public policy.”55 The Institute’s Advisory Committee
50. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 678. Prior to Louisiana’s codification,
conflicts rules were found in Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 articles 9 and 10,
revised statutes, and jurisprudence. Id. There was no specific rule for tort conflicts
in the code articles. Id. Article 9 was meant to govern tort conflicts, but Louisiana
courts followed lex loci delicti under the influence of its common law neighbors.
Id. at 678−80.
51. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides, Committee Reporter, Louisiana
State Law Institute Conflicts Projet, to the Louisiana State Law Institute Conflicts
Projet Committee (Feb. 5, 1990) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
The following members comprised the Institute’s Advisory Committee for the
Codification of Louisiana Conflict of Laws: David Conroy, Harvey Couch, James
L. Dennis, Cordell H. Haymon, Harry T. Lemmon, Howard W. L’Enfant, Andrew
Rinker, Jr., Raphael J. Rabalais, Katherine S. Spaht, A.N. Yiannopoulos, staff
attorney James J. Carter, Jr., and Committee Reporter Symeon C. Symeonides. See
Symeonides, supra note 47, at 683 n.35.
52. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides to the Louisiana State Law Institute
Conflicts Projet Committee, supra note 51. The Institute’s Advisory Committee
for the Codification of Louisiana Conflict of Laws approved the proposed code
articles, then submitted the proposal to the Council of the Institute. Id. The
Council of the Institute approved the proposal as a whole on March 17, 1989. Id.
Senators McLeod and Nelson introduced the proposal to the Louisiana Legislature
as Senate Bill 646 during the 1990 Regular Legislative Session. Letter from
Symeon C. Symeonides to the Louisiana State Law Institute Conflicts Projet
Committee, supra note 2. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Senate, and
the House Civil Law and Procedure Committee approved the Bill, but the House
deferred the Bill for further study. Id.
53. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides to the Louisiana State Law Institute
Conflicts Projet Committee, supra note 2.
54. Id.
55. The proposed additional article read as follows:
Article ‘X’. Ordre public. When the law of another state is designated as
applicable to an issue under the provisions of this Chapter, the
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had considered such an article prior to its first legislative proposal
and decided to omit it because the committee believed that “the
flexibility . . . built into [the Projet] permit[ted] and require[d] the
judge to take account of Louisiana’s public policy in every, not just
the last, step of the choice-of-law analysis.”56
The Committee also faced the question of “what effect punitive
damages [would] have on the tort law in Louisiana.”57 Professor
Symeon Symeonides, the Committee Reporter, promptly assuaged
this concern and responded that “the intent of the Projet’s drafters
was precisely not to affect at all Louisiana’s substantive law on the
issue.”58 He further explained that “[t]he Projet simply delineate[d],
and [did] so in a very conservative manner, the circumstances under
which punitive damages may be awarded, if and when such
damages are imposed by a—usually foreign—law that is otherwise
applicable to the dispute.”59
The Committee resubmitted the original Projet for the 1991
Regular Legislative Session but failed to adopt the recommended
article that would ensure that Louisiana’s longstanding public policy
against punitive damages was explicitly protected in multistate tort
conflicts.60 The Legislature adopted the Projet, and the articles were
then added to the Louisiana Civil Code as Book IV Conflict of

Id.

application of such law may be refused [only] if it would lead to a result
that is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of
this State as understood in interstate or international relations.

56. Id. In response, the Institute’s Advisory Committee for the Codification of
Louisiana Conflict of Laws insisted that:
the Projet: (a) [did] not change an iota in Louisiana’s policy against
punitive damages; (b) . . . delineate[d] more narrowly than any other
state, and more narrowly than present Louisiana jurisprudence, the cases
in which punitive damages may be awarded under a foreign law that is
otherwise applicable to the case (Art. 46); and (c) even in those cases, it
allows the court to not award punitive damages if it determines that “the
policies of another state [e.g. Louisiana] would be more seriously
impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue [e.g. punitive
damages]” (Art. 47.).
Id. These were the original intended numbers for the enactment, but they were
later renumbered. Id. Articles 46 and 47 were renumbered to be articles 3546 and
3547. Id. See infra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of their content.
57. Letter from Symeon C. Symeonides, Committee Reporter, Louisiana
State Law Institute Conflicts Projet, to Oliver P. Stockwell, attorney (Feb. 12,
1990) (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Act No. 923, 1991 La. Acts 251.
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Laws.61 These articles remain the governing law regarding punitive
damages in choice-of-law situations.62
2. Hidden in the Trojan Horse: Allowing Punitive Damages
Under the Current Conflict-of-Laws Articles
Although the Projet drafters insisted that the conflicts
codification insulated Louisiana law from punitive damages,63 the
conflict-of-laws provisions nonetheless provide ample opportunity
to recover punitive damages,64 in addition to the statutorily excepted
provisions,65 because the choice-of-law articles governing an award
of punitive damages in a Louisiana forum permit the application of
another state’s law in limited circumstances.66
Louisiana Civil Code Book IV “is based on the premise that the
choice-of-law process should strive for ways to minimize the
impairment of the involved states’ interests, rather than to maximize
one state’s interests at the expense of those of the other states”
through an analysis of policy and pertinent contacts.67 Book IV
61. Id. Although the 36 articles adopted in Act Number 923 were numbered
as articles 14 to 49, all but article 14 were adopted as articles 3515 to 3549 in a
newly created Book IV Conflict of Laws to avoid renumbering Book I of the Civil
Code. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 685−86 n.43. The Louisiana State Law
Institute renumbered these articles through its statutory authority after Act Number
923 was passed. Id. Articles 3542 through 3548 are the most important to the
scope of this Comment. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3542−3548 (2013); infra Part
II.B.2.
62. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3515−3549 (2013).
63. See supra Part II.B.1.
64. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); Arabie
v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Evans v. TIN,
Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–2348, 11–2351, 11–2417,
11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–3048, 11–3049, 12–18, 11–
3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012).
65. See supra Part II.A.2.
66. See arts. 3542−3548. Article 14 on multistate cases provides that “[u]nless
otherwise expressly provided by the law of this state, cases having contacts with
other states are governed by the law selected in accordance with the provisions of
Book IV of this Code.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 14 (2013). This article lays the
foundation to apply the articles in Book IV to multistate tort cases, “whether these
contacts pertain to the domicile of the parties, the transaction or the occurrence
giving rise to the dispute, or the location of its object or subject matter.” See
Symeonides, supra note 47, at 687. Article 14 is the only conflict-of-laws article
that retains its original location in Book I of the Civil Code. Id. at 686. See infra
note 62.
67. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 690. This analysis “is accomplished by
identifying the state that, in light of its relationship to the parties and to the dispute,
and the policies rendered pertinent by that relationship, would suffer the most
serious legal, social, economic, and other consequences if the court did not apply
its law to the issue.” Id. Louisiana Civil Code Book IV establishes the framework
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begins with a general, residual rule on how to determine the
applicable law. Article 3515 specifically provides that “an issue in a
case having contacts with other states is governed by the law of the
state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law
were not applied to that issue.”68 To make that determination, article
3515 requires the court to consider “the strength and pertinence of
the relevant policies of all involved states,”69 with special
consideration for the relationship between the parties, the state
policies involved, and the expectations of the parties.70
Professor Symeonides warned that some policies “are more
susceptible to being overlooked if they are not brought to the
attention of the decisionmaker.”71 Another important consideration
is that “the parties should not be subjected to a law whose
application they had no reason to anticipate.”72
In addition to the general, residual rule of article 3515, Book IV
specifically addresses delictual obligations involving several

for the application of its Title 7, which specifically governs conflict of laws for
delictual and quasi-delictual obligations. See arts. 3542–3548.
68. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2013).
69. Id. The policies referenced in article 3515 “should include not only those
embodied in the rules of law claimed to be applicable, but also the more general
policies, domestic as well as multistate, that might be pertinent to the particular
issue.” Symeonides, supra note 47, at 692. In fact, the original draft of article 3515
included the language “the policies embodied in the particular rules of law claimed
to be applicable as well as any other pertinent policies of the involved states,” but
the Louisiana State Law Institute’s Semantics Committee replaced the phrase with
“relevant policies” because it thought the lengthier version was redundant. Id. at
693 n.86 (quoting LOUISIANA STATE LAW INST., ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
REVISION OF PRELIMINARY TITLE OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 1870: LAW OF CONFLICTS
OF LAWS: A PROJET 1 (Comm. Print 1989) (Symeon C. Symeonides, Committee
Reporter, adopted Mar. 17, 1989) (on file with the Tulane Law Review); cf.
ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRATUMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS 76−79, 376−78, 392, 394−95, 406−08 (1965)). The Institute’s
Coordinating Committee made further non-substantive, semantical revisions after
the passage of the proposal. Symeonides, supra note 43.
70. Art. 3515. Symeonides further described the policy consideration
embodied in article 3515 as “[a] legislative policy that is strongly espoused by the
enacting state for intrastate cases may in fact be attenuated in a particular
multistate case that has only minimal contacts with that state.” Symeonides, supra
note 47, at 693. Similarly, “the same policy may prove to be far less pertinent if
the case has sufficient contacts with that state, but not contacts of the type that
would actually implicate that policy.” Id.
71. See Symeonides, supra note 47, at 694 n.35 (citing art. 3515). This is why
the second paragraph of article 3515 expressly mentions “the policies of upholding
the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences
that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.” Id.
72. Id. at 695.
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states.73 In particular, article 3546 addresses the treatment of
punitive damages in a choice-of-law analysis for multistate torts.74
Article 3546 reads:
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this
state unless authorized:
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct
occurred and by either the law of the state where the
resulting injury occurred or the law of the place where
the person whose conduct caused the injury was
domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and
by the law of the state where the person whose conduct
caused the injury was domiciled.75
Thus, article 3546 specifically prohibits the award of punitive
damages by a Louisiana court, unless the substantive law of a
minimum of two of the three listed locations allows the award of
punitive damages: (1) the place of the alleged injurious conduct, (2)
the place of the alleged injury, or (3) the place of the defendant’s
domicile.76 The language in article 3546 stating: “may not be
awarded . . . unless” reaffirms Louisiana’s restrictive view on the
authorization of punitive damages in multistate tort conflicts.77
However, from the very text of article 3546, there is an oddity in the
statutory exception allowing punitive damages in multistate torts
because there are three clauses and two provisions.78 This allows
parties to prepare alternative arguments within the three provisions
in the text of the article, while only needing to satisfy two of the
provisions, which allows wide latitude for an award of punitive
damages in contrast with Louisiana’s limited statutory exceptions.79

73. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3542−3548 (2013). Article 3542 parallels article
3515 and sets forth the general rule on multistate tort conflicts. Art. 3542. Article
3542 explains that to determine which state’s policies would be the “most
seriously impaired” if not applied, the analysis should first consider “the pertinent
contacts of each state to the parties and the events giving rise to the dispute,
including the place of conduct and injury, the domicile, habitual residence, or
place of business of the parties, and the state in which the relationship, if any,
between the parties was centered.” Id. Next, the analysis should look to “the
policies referred to in article 3515, as well as the policies of deterring wrongful
conduct and of repairing the consequences of injurious acts.” Id.
74. Art. 3546.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. See infra Part III.
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One of the most important determinations that must be made in
any choice-of-law analysis, including claims for punitive damages,
is the domicile of the parties. The general rule is that “[a] juridical
person may be treated as a domiciliary of either the state of its
formation or the state of its principal place of business, whichever is
most pertinent to the particular issue.”80 However, in an effort to
subject out-of-state tortfeasors to jurisdiction in Louisiana, “a
juridical person that is domiciled outside this state, but which
transacts business in this state and incurs a delictual . . . obligation
arising from activity within this state, shall be treated as a
domiciliary of this state,” as long as it is consistent with policy
considerations enumerated under article 3542.81 The duality of these
two domicile rules allows manipulation of their application based on
which domicile is preferential to the particular plaintiff.82
The defendant’s domicile is crucial to the analysis in a claim for
punitive damages in a multistate tort conflict because it is a
requirement for such awards under the law of another state.83
Although an out-of-state tortfeasor “shall be domiciled” in
Louisiana for delictual liability arising from activity within this
state, plaintiffs may argue that policy concerns favor domiciling the
corporation in a forum that allows punitive damages.84 If the court
agrees that policy considerations indicate that the defendant should
be domiciled in a state that allows an award of punitive damages and
the plaintiff proves that either the injurious conduct or the resulting
injury occurred in a state that allows punitive damages as well, the
plaintiff may secure an award of punitive damages under another
state’s law. Such an award circumvents the codal attempt to subject
out-of-state actors to Louisiana law governing delictual liability in
multistate torts.85
Moreover, article 3547 on exceptional cases creates an “escape
hatch” and allows the court to consider whether, under the totality of
80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3518 (2013) (emphasis added).
81. Id. art. 3548. See also id. art. 3542 (promulgating the general rule
governing delictual obligations). See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy
considerations.
82. It is important to note that article 3548 dictates that a juridical person
“shall” be domiciled in Louisiana if consistent with article 3542. Art. 3548.
Professor Symeonides stressed that article 3548 may protect out-of-state
corporations from punitive damages liability but only if the court agrees this is
appropriate under article 3542. Arts. 3542, 3548. See Symeonides, supra note 47,
at 762. See infra Part III for a discussion of the application of these articles in
Arabie. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012); Arabie v.
CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
83. Arts. 3518, 3548.
84. Art. 3548.
85. Id. arts. 3546, 3548.
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the circumstances, to apply the law of another involved state,
irrespective of any other Civil Code provisions, if “it is clearly
evident . . . that the policies of another state would be more seriously
impaired if its law were not applied to the particular issue.”86 This
“escape hatch” conflicts with Louisiana’s legislative policy to
strictly limit the award of punitive damages because it enables
plaintiffs to recoup punitive damages not allowed through
Louisiana’s statutory exceptions and narrow choice-of-law
provisions.87
Although the conflict-of-laws articles provide courts with the
tools to evaluate a multistate tort conflict through a step-by-step
analysis, there are flaws hidden within the articles. These flaws
became evident in the Arabie litigation.88 Plaintiffs and defendants
need to know how to proceed with reasonable certainty when a
Louisiana court may award punitive damages under the law of
another state. Louisiana has a mainstream approach to choice-of-law
in general,89 yet Louisiana takes the minority approach by expressly
prohibiting punitive damages, creating policy concerns in a choiceof-law analysis.90 The outcome of future multistate tort cases is
currently unclear, which opens the door to years of litigation on the
meaning of the choice-of-law articles in relation to punitive
damages. This lack of clarity may further suggest the need for
legislative clarification.91
III. THE TROJAN HORSE ENTERS: ARABIE V. CITGO PETROLEUM
CORP.
Arabie was the first case involving the Louisiana choice-of-law
provisions on punitive damages to reach the Louisiana Supreme
Court.92 Arabie traveled from the Fourteenth Judicial District
86. Id. art. 3547. The principles of article 3542 are used to consider “whether
the policy of another state would be more seriously impaired it its law were not
applied to the particular issue.” Id. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy
considerations.
87. See, e.g., Cain v. Altec Industries, Inc., 236 F. App’x. 965 (5th Cir. 2007)
(awarding damages under another state’s law using article 3547 to circumvent the
application of Louisiana’s choice-of-law principles). Compare art. 3546, with art.
3547 (allowing parties to circumvent codal requirements).
88. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of Book IV. See infra Part III for a
discussion of the Arabie litigation. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d
307 (La. 2012); Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App.
2010). See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the flaws in the code articles.
89. See supra Part II.B.
90. See supra Part II.A; infra Part IV.C.
91. See infra Part IV.B.
92. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307.
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Court,93 to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal,94 and ultimately to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which reversed the lower courts’ awards
of punitive damages.95 However, despite the High Court’s
seemingly definitive holding, the Court’s analysis and subsequent
cases96 demonstrate the flaws in the conflict-of-laws provisions
governing conduct and domicile that need legislative attention.97
A. Sneaking in the Trojan Horse: The Trial Court’s Award of
Punitive Damages
The dispute in Arabie arose after CITGO Petroleum Corp.
unintentionally released 4 million gallons of hazardous slop oil and
17 million gallons of wastewater into the Calcasieu River in Lake
Charles, Louisiana, in a refinery spill on June 19, 2006.98 The spill
originated from the storm surge storage tanks in the refinery’s
wastewater treatment unit (WWTU) built in 1994.99 The dike
around the tanks failed to contain the spillage, and the 21 million
gallons of oil and wastewater migrated downriver to the Ron
Williams Construction site at the Calcasieu Refining Company
where the plaintiffs were working.100
Fourteen plaintiffs filed suit in Louisiana state court against
CITGO and R & R Construction.101 Some who were directly
93. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. 2007-2738, 2009 WL 7170890
(La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2009).
94. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
95. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307.
96. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of Evans v. TIN, Inc. Evans v. TIN,
Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–2348, 11–2351, 11–2417,
11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–3048, 11–3049, 12–18, 11–
3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012).
97. Arabie, 89 So. 3d 307. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of legislative
proposals.
98. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 533.
99. Id. The function of the WWTU was to treat wastewater then discharge it
into the Calcasieu River. Id. Two 10 million gallon storm tanks stored the
untreated wastewater, but the skimmers designed to remove the oil from the
wastewater had been inoperable since shortly after the WWTU was built. Id. Over
time, eight feet of slop oil accumulated under the wastewater stored in the tanks.
Id. This accumulation resulted in a capacity overload because the two tanks
experienced heavy rainfall in a very short period of time. Id.
100. Id. In response to the accident, CITGO implemented a two-month cleanup
project in proximity to Calcasieu Refining Company. Id. Booms absorbed the oil
and were deposited into a dumpster called a roll-off box 30 feet from the
plaintiffs’ break tent, where there were daily construction meetings. Id.
101. Id. The plaintiffs alleged negligence against R & R Construction, who had
contracted to build a new levee system around a third storm water tank at
CITGO’s WWTU. Id. CITGO entered a plea agreement in federal court for
“Negligently Discharging a Pollutant from a Point Source into the Navigable
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exposed to the slop oil claimed physical injuries such as vomiting,
rashes, headaches, nausea, and eye, nose, and throat problems.102
CITGO and R & R filed a joint admission of fault for the release of
the slop oil.103 The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs for their
compensatory damages if the plaintiffs were able to prove that the
dike failure at the CITGO refinery in Louisiana proximately caused
those damages.104
Then, only after CITGO’s admission of fault, the plaintiffs
amended their suit to include CITGO’s liability for punitive
damages, in addition to compensatory damages.105 Plaintiffs
asserted that CITGO was headquartered in Oklahoma, prior to 2004,
when the corporation moved its headquarters to Texas.106 The
plaintiffs alleged that CITGO intentionally underbuilt the Louisiana
refinery’s WWTU based on corporate headquarters’ decisions.107
Through this line of reasoning, plaintiffs attempted to use
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws rules to claim that the corporatefunding decisions made over the years in Oklahoma and Texas
constituted the injurious conduct, therefore allowing an award of
punitive damages under the law of either state.108

Waters of the United States in violation of Title 33 of the United States Code” on
September 17, 2008. Id. at 533−54. CITGO agreed to a criminal fine of $13
million in exchange for the government agreeing not to prosecute additional
criminal offenses related to the refinery spill. Id. at 534. Specific offenses known
to the government included discharges of pollutants, Clean Air Act violations,
record-keeping violations, and disposal and treatment violations. Id. The state trial
court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of comparative
fault of the plaintiffs, their employer, and the premise owner. Id.
102. Id. at 534.
103. Id.
104. Id. The defendants specifically agreed to “pay (upon final judgment after
all appeals) plaintiffs for all their compensatory damages assessed to CITGO and
R & R, if any, that plaintiffs [were] able to prove to the Court were proximately
caused by such release from the CITGO refinery in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana,
on or about June 19, 2006.” Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The plaintiffs cited corporate headquarters’ decision to delete a third
storage tank in the original unit design in order to save millions of dollars in
expenses made in the early 1990s as the injurious conduct. Id. CITGO had actually
approved engineering for the addition of the WWTU’s originally deleted third
tank in 2004 and approved funding for the third tank in 2005. Id. The plaintiffs
argued that fund diversion to profit-centered projects was the reason the third tank
was not functional at the time of the spill in 2006. Id.
108. Id. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the conflict-of-laws
provisions on punitive damages. The trial was a bench trial because Louisiana law
only provides for a jury trial in civil cases with damages claims above $50,000.
See infra Part IV.C. Both Oklahoma law and Texas law permit punitive damages
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The trial court awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$30,000 to each of the plaintiffs.109 The court determined that two of
the requisite three requirements under article 3546 were satisfied,
namely (1) that the injurious conduct occurred in a state that allowed
punitive damages and (2) that CITGO was also domiciled in that
state.110 First, the trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
injurious conduct occurred through corporate decision-making at
headquarters in Oklahoma and Texas.111 Second, the trial court
determined that CITGO was domiciled at its corporate headquarters
in Oklahoma at the time the WWTU was constructed and when the
decision to delete the third tank was made.112 Relatedly, the court
determined that after moving headquarters in 2004, CITGO was
domiciled in Texas until the time of the refinery spill in 2006.113
Thus, even though Louisiana law did not allow for punitive damages
under the facts of the case, the trial court judge was able to award
them under the conflict-of-laws provisions all the same.114 CITGO
then appealed the award of punitive damages.115
B. Grooming the Trojan Horse: The Appellate Court’s Affirmation
of Punitive Damages
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the
punitive damages award despite CITGO’s argument that Louisiana
law, rather than the law of Oklahoma or Texas, should have
governed the award of punitive damages.116 The appellate court
analyzed the issue under Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws articles and
agreed that article 3546 authorized punitive damages because the
plaintiffs established (1) that the law of the state of the injurious

for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from the tortious conduct. See OKLA. STAT. tit.
23, § 9.1 (Westlaw 2013); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West
2008); Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 551−52.
109. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 534, 554. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of
article 3546.
110. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 551. The plaintiffs specifically argued for punitive
damages under the law of Texas or Oklahoma. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra Part II.B.2.
115. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 534.
116. Id. at 533, 551. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal only admonished the
trial court on one issue: its failure to clarify whether it applied Texas or Oklahoma
law for the award of punitive damages. Id. at 558. Otherwise, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id.
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conduct and (2) that the law of the state of the defendant’s domicile
would permit an award of punitive damages.117
First, in its analysis of injurious conduct, the appellate court
agreed that CITGO’s refinery spill caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.118
However, instead of finding that the injurious conduct that caused
the refinery spill leading to the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in
Louisiana at the time of CITGO’s refinery spill, the appellate court
deferred to the factual findings of the trial court, which determined
that the injurious conduct occurred in Oklahoma and Texas at the
time of corporate headquarters’ decisions.119
Second, in its analysis of CITGO’s domicile, the court
considered whether CITGO should be an out-of-state corporation
domiciled in Louisiana or whether CITGO should be domiciled at
its principle place of business in Oklahoma or Texas.120 CITGO
argued that it should be a Louisiana domiciliary because, although
its headquarters are in Texas, CITGO is a juridical person that
transacts business in Louisiana and incurred delictual liability
arising from activity in Louisiana.121
The court rejected CITGO’s argument and concluded that
CITGO was domiciled in Texas under an interest analysis122 that
determined which state’s policies “would be most seriously
impaired if its law were not applied to that issue” by weighing the
“pertinent contacts of each state” to the parties and the events giving
rise to the dispute against policy concerns,123 including the policies
deterring wrongful conduct.124
117. Id. at 552.
118. Id. at 547. The court said that it found “no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s determination that CITGO’s spill of slop oil caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.”
Id.
119. The court cited article 3546, comment (d), which leads to article 3543,
comment (h) to evaluate conduct that occurred in more than one state. Id. at 552.
The court relied on comment (h) to article 3543, which explains that where the
injurious conduct occurred in more than one state, the case should be “approached
under the principles of causation of the law of the forum” to legally “determine
which particular conduct was . . . the principal cause of the injury.” Id. (citing LA.
CIV. CODE art. 3543 cmt. h (2013)).
120. Id. at 552. Article 3546, comment (d) led the court to articles 3518 and
3548 governing domicile. Id. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of articles
3518 and 3548.
121. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 552. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of articles
3518 and 3548.
122. Article 3542 sets forth the interest analysis. See supra note 73 for a
discussion of the policy considerations underlying article 3542.
123. Article 3515 sets forth important policy considerations for the article 3542
interest analysis. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2013).
124. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 552 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542 (2013)). To
consider the pertinent contacts component of article 3542, the court should
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Under the first prong of the interest analysis, the appellate court
considered the pertinent contacts and the events leading up to the
dispute.125 The court conceded that CITGO had pertinent contacts
with Louisiana, but it discounted the strength of these contacts by
failing to identify any contacts supporting CITGO being a Louisiana
domiciliary.126 Therefore, according to the appellate court, CITGO
should be domiciled in Texas.127 The court next analyzed the events
giving rise to the dispute.128 The appellate court agreed that
CITGO’s corporate management intentionally underbuilt the
WWTU because of corporate headquarters’ decisions in Oklahoma
and Texas; then later corporate decisions caused construction delays
resulting in a third tank not being complete by the time of the spill in
2006.129 The court rejected CITGO’s counterarguments that the
WWTU was not intentionally underbuilt and that the decisions to
add a third tank occurred at the Louisiana refinery.130

evaluate “the events giving rise to the dispute, including the place of conduct and
injury, the domicile, habitual resident, or place of business of the parties, and the
state in which the relationship, if any, between the parties was centered.” Id.
125. Id. at 552.
126. Id. The court relied upon the fact that CITGO is an international
corporation with headquarters in Texas. Id. The court determined corporate
headquarters in Texas to be the most pertinent contact by citing CITGO’s “Safety,
Health, and Environmental Management Policy 80–100,” which dictates that
“Executive Management of the Corporation establishes policies, approves
standards and goals for performance, and reviews HS&E compliance for all
facilities,” as well as being responsible for comprehensive reviews and assessment
of its facilities. Id. at 552–53.
127. Id. at 553.
128. Id.
129. Id. Plaintiffs argued the following points in support of their argument that
the events giving rise to the dispute occurred at corporate headquarters. Id. First, a
memo dated August 15, 1992, indicated that employees from Tulsa headquarters
visited Lake Charles with the intent to reduce the scope and cost of the WWTU.
Id. Second, the 1994 deadline for the WWTU was extended to conduct cost
reduction studies. Id. Third, seven items labeled “Wastewater Equipment
Eliminated for Cost Reduction” were deleted from the original WWTU proposal.
Id. This saved $35.3 million including $12 million for “One Stormwater Tank.”
Id. Fourth, several near overflows and diversions of wastewater occurred when the
WWTU opened. Id. Fifth, Lake Charles first suggested reassessing the WWTU
capacity in 1996, with the first recommendation for a third tank in 2002. Id. Sixth,
it took nearly a year between initial approval in May of 2004 until final approval
in March of 2005 for funding to be approved for a third tank. Id. Seventh,
construction on the third tank did not commence until spring of 2006 and was
incomplete at the time of the spill on June 19, 2006. Id.
130. Id.
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Under the second prong of the interest analysis,131 the court must
weigh policy considerations,132 including the interests in deterring
wrongful conduct and repairing the consequences of injurious
acts.133 The appellate court denied Louisiana’s policy against
punitive damages and chastised CITGO, claiming that they were
“paint[ing] with too broad a brush and too heavy a hand.”134 The
court said that “Louisiana does not have a policy of protecting all
out of state defendants from their own state’s law.”135 Further,
“Louisiana [does not] have an unswerving interest in rejecting all
punitive damages,” which the court supported by citing the few
131. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
132. Article 3515 sets forth important policy considerations for the article 3542
interest analysis. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3515 (2013).
133. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3515, 3542 (2013). The
guidelines for the choice-of-law analysis balance
the relevant policies of all involved states in light of: (1) the
relationships of each state to the parties and the dispute; and (2) the
policies and needs of the interstate . . . systems, including the policies
of upholding the justified expectations of parties and of minimizing the
adverse consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the
law of more than one state.
Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 555 (emphasis added) (citing art. 3515). The appellate court
determined that the state with the “higher standard of conduct” should be the law
considered in issues of conduct and safety. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3543
(2013). The court interpreted the “higher standard of conduct” to be the state law
allowing punitive damages for negligent conduct, which would be Texas or
Oklahoma. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 555. The court deferred to article 3543, comment
(f) for an explanation as to why the law of Texas or Oklahoma should apply and
outweigh Louisiana’s interest. Id. See art. 3543 cmt. f; Arabie, 49 So. 3d at
555−56. The court moved to article 3543, comment (h), which suggests that the
law should be determined “under the principles of causation of the law of the
forum” in cases in which injurious conduct occurs in more than one state. Id. at
556. See art. 3543 cmt. h. The comment stresses the determination of “the
principal cause of injury” to decide upon application of the law or the state of
injury or the state of conduct. Id. The comment provides two alternatives: deferral
to article 3542 if the determination of causation is unclear or application of article
3547 if the injurious conduct was not localized in any single state. Id. See id. arts.
3542, 3547.
134. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. CITGO cited Commercial Union Insurance Co.
v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp 453 (E.D. La. 1976), and Karavokiros v. Indiana
Motor Bus Co., 524 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. La. 1981), to support its argument
perpetuating Louisiana’s purported policy against punitive damages. Arabie, 49
So. 3d at 554 (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co., 409 F. Supp. 453; Karavokiros,
524 F. Supp. 385). The court dismissed CITGO’s argument regarding the
Louisiana Legislature’s intent to restrict punitive damages in repealing article
2315.3. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of former
article 2315.3. The court cited article 3546 as the governing framework within the
conflict-of-laws statutes to refute CITGO’s reliance on legislative policy. Id. at
554.
135. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554 (emphasis added).
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statutory exceptions in the Louisiana Civil Code: child pornography,
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and criminal sexual
activity with a child.136 Therefore, both prongs of the interest
analysis weighed in favor of CITGO being an out-of-state
domiciliary.137
The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s award of
punitive damages.138 However, the appellate court failed to
thoroughly analyze all of the relevant choice-of-law considerations
that would determine that the injurious conduct occurred in
Louisiana and favor CITGO as a Louisiana domiciliary, which
would have resulted in a reversal of the trial court’s award of
punitive damages.139 CITGO then successfully sought a writ of
certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court.140
C. Closing the Door to the Trojan Horse: The Louisiana Supreme
Court’s Denial of Punitive Damages
The Louisiana Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ award
of punitive damages in a splintered decision.141 The Court performed
a detailed analysis of the punitive damages awarded under
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions.142 The Court identified
legislative intent, beginning with the language of the statute, as the
fundamental question because the core issue in the punitive damages
136. Id. (emphasis added). The Third Circuit reasoned that punitive damages
were permissible not only under article 3546 but under four articles in the
Louisiana Civil Code as well. Id. at 551. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2315.3, 2315.4,
2315.7 (2013). See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the statutory exceptions to
punitive damages in Louisiana.
137. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 554. See arts. 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.7. See supra Part
II.A.2 for a discussion of the statutory exceptions to punitive damages in
Louisiana.
138. Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 557. The court relied on articles 3515, 3518, 3542,
3543, and 3546. Id. at 556. Both the trial court and the appellate court reserved
application of article 3547 as a fallback provision to award punitive damages in
addition to the other conflict-of-laws articles. Id. The court decided that there was
no conflict of laws between Texas and Oklahoma; the court ultimately chose to
apply Texas law because it had the greater interest in enforcing its own law as the
current domicile of CITGO. Id. The court cited article 3543 on the point of no true
conflict between Texas and Oklahoma. Id. The court cited article 3542 and 3546
for further support on applying Texas law under an interest analysis. Id.
139. Id. at 529.
140. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307 (La. 2012).
141. Id. Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Guidry, Weimer, Victory, and Chief Justice Kimball. Id. Justice Guidry concurred
in the result but assigned reasons. Justices Knoll and Johnson concurred in part
and dissented in part. Id.
142. Id.
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award is based on the statutory interpretation of the conflict-of-laws
articles, especially in light of Louisiana’s general policy against
punitive damages.143 The Court began its legislative interpretation
with article 3546 on punitive damages and analyzed each of the
three requisite factors: (1) the place of the injurious conduct, (2) the
place of the resulting injury, and (3) the place of the defendant’s
domicile.144
First, the Court affirmed that the resulting injuries occurred in
Louisiana.145 Second, the Court analyzed CITGO’s domicile to
determine whether CITGO should be domiciled in Louisiana for
choice-of-law purposes or at its principle place of business in Texas
or Oklahoma.146 Under the rules of statutory interpretation, “when
two statutes apply to the same subject matter and their language
cannot be harmonized, the language of the more specific statute
applies . . . which . . . would be article 3548,” mandating that
CITGO be domiciled in Louisiana in this case.147
Instead of circumventing the application of article 3548 as the
appellate court did,148 the Supreme Court harmonized the general
choice-of-law provisions on domicile and the choice-of-law
provisions on out-of-state domiciliaries incurring delictual liability
in Louisiana.149 The Court found that while CITGO is a juridical
person domiciled in Texas at its corporate headquarters under the
general choice-of-law provisions, article 3548 requires that CITGO
be considered a Louisiana domiciliary for the purpose of this
delictual obligation, if appropriate under an interest analysis.150 The
Court recognized that article 3548 on the domicile of out-of-state
corporations includes the word “shall,” so the application of this
article is mandatory when a juridical person incurs delictual liability
in Louisiana.151

143. Id. at 312 (citing City of DeQuincy v. Henry, 62 So. 3d 43, 46 (La. 2011);
In re Succession of Faget, 53 So. 3d 414, 420 (La. 2010)). The court recognized
that “the Official Revision Comments are not the law,” unlike the appellate court,
which heavily relied on the Official Revision Comments to affirm the damages
award. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 312. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 351 So. 2d 1194, 1195
(La. 1977).
144. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313.
145. Id. at 313−14.
146. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3518, 3548 (2013); supra Part II.B.2.
147. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313−14.
148. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the appellate court’s analysis of
domicile.
149. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313−14.
150. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3542 (2013). See supra note 73 for the article
3542 policy considerations.
151. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 312, 314.
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The Court also recognized that the appellate court failed to
mention any factors to support CITGO being a domiciliary of
Louisiana in its interest analysis152 and that the trial court failed to
discuss each state’s contacts in its interest analysis.153 The Supreme
Court then properly performed an interest analysis in consideration
of the specific facts of Arabie, including those contacts that favor
CITGO as a Louisiana domiciliary.154
In a case less than a year earlier than Arabie, the Supreme Court
analyzed the domicile of a corporate defendant in a multistate tort
conflict.155 To identify which of the involved state’s policies would
be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied, the Court
extracted a multifactor balancing test from the conflict-of-laws
interest analysis.156 In its application to the facts of Arabie, the
152. Id. at 314. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
The appellate court referenced the considerations in article 3542 as controlling
domicile, in addition to the considerations under article 3548. See supra Part III.B.
153. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313, 316. See supra note 73 for the article 3542
policy considerations.
154. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
155. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 315 (citing Wooley v. Lucksinger, 61 So. 3d 507,
567 (La. 2011)). In Wooley, the Court chose to apply Texas law to award punitive
damages in a delictual obligation arising between two Texas domiciliaries, one
Louisiana domiciliary, and one Oklahoma domiciliary because the majority of the
tortious conduct and the most severe harm occurred in Texas, although harm
occurred in all three states. Wooley, 61 So. 3d at 567.
156. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 313, 315−16. Article 3542, comment (a) instructs that
this listing is merely illustrative and should be quantitatively evaluated. Id. at 316.
The factors are extracted from article 3542 and include factors from article 3515 as
well:
(1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties; (2) their contacts to
the events giving rise to the dispute, including the place and conduct and
injury; (3) the domicile, habitual residence, or place of business of the
parties; (4) the state in which the relationship between the parties was
centered; (5) deterring wrongful conduct; and (6) repairing the
consequences of injurious acts . . . (7) the relationship of each state to the
parties and the dispute; and (8) the policies and needs of the interstate
system, including the policies of upholding the justified expectations of
the parties and of minimizing the adverse consequences that might follow
from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.
Id. Under the first factor—pertinent contacts—the Supreme Court found that the
plaintiffs only had contact with Louisiana, which favored application of Louisiana
law. Id. at 317. In evaluating the second factor—the state’s contacts giving rise to
the dispute—the Court held that corporate decisions must outweigh local tortious
conduct to be the place of injurious conduct in light of Louisiana’s legislative
policy against punitive damages. Id. The Court pointed out that even if the third 10
million gallon tank at the WWTU had been complete at the time of the refinery
spill, the third tank could not have contained 21 million gallons of waste, along
with eight additional perfunctory deficiencies at the Lake Charles refinery, which
contributed to the spill. Id. at 317−18. For these reasons, the construction delay of
the third tank did not cause the spill nor outweigh the allegedly tortious conduct at
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Supreme Court explicitly noted that the plaintiffs only had contact
with Louisiana and that CITGO anticipated defending a claim for
injury that occurred in Louisiana under Louisiana law.157 From a
policy standpoint, the court reasoned that an award of punitive
damages under Texas or Oklahoma law was overshadowed by
Louisiana’s legislative policy disfavoring punitive damages, unlike
the appellate court’s denial of Louisiana’s policy against punitive
damages.158 The compensatory damages awarded under Louisiana
law repaired the consequences of injurious acts without the need for
an award of punitive damages.159 For these reasons and others found
through performing the multifactor interest analysis,160 the Supreme
Court concluded that it was “appropriate” for CITGO to be domiciled
in Louisiana as a juridical person.161 Therefore, CITGO could not be
liable for punitive damages under article 3546 because its domicile
was deemed to be in Louisiana and Louisiana was the place where the
resulting injury occurred, meaning that at most, only one of the
requisite three factors for an award of punitive damages—the place of
the injurious conduct—could be satisfied.162 Thus, the Court affirmed

the Lake Charles refinery. Id. at 318. The third factor—domicile—also favored
Louisiana law because CITGO’s large Louisiana operation constitutes a place of
business and all plaintiffs are habitual residents and domiciliaries of Louisiana. Id.
The fourth factor—relationship between the parties—again supports Louisiana
law because the spill in Louisiana is the only contact between the plaintiffs and the
defendants. Id. The Court discounted the fifth factor—deterring wrongful
conduct—by reasoning that the award of punitive damages is overshadowed by
Louisiana’s legislative policy disfavoring punitive damages. Id. The compensatory
damages awarded under Louisiana law satisfied the sixth factor—repairing the
consequences of injurious acts—without the need for an award of punitive
damages. Id. The seventh factor—the relationship between the states and parties—
favors Louisiana law because of the extent of conduct in Louisiana because
plaintiffs reside in and are employed in Louisiana and because plaintiffs filed suit
in Louisiana. Id. at 319. The eighth factor—policy interests—again favors
Louisiana law because CITGO anticipated defending a claim for injury that
occurred in Louisiana under Louisiana law; neither decisions made in Texas nor in
Oklahoma were the primary cause of plaintiffs’ injury in Louisiana. Id.
157. Id. at 319.
158. Id. at 318.
159. Id.
160. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
161. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 319.
162. Id. The Court then analyzed article 3543 on conduct and safety. Id. at 320.
It found that article 3543 should not apply to allow another state’s punitive
damages law, contrary to what the lower courts decided. Id. The Court again
applied the principles of statutory interpretation to determine that article 3546 on
punitive damages should apply, rather than article 3543 on conduct and safety,
because the more specific statute should apply when two statutes apply to the
same subject matter and their language cannot be harmonized. Id. at 320 (citing
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the place of injurious conduct to be Louisiana, negating any possible
award of punitive damages under Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws
provisions allowing such awards under the law of another state.163
The Supreme Court also denied application of the choice-of-law
allowance for exceptional cases as an “escape hatch” through which
to award punitive damages in the alternative and to circumvent the
application of the more specific conflict-of-laws provisions on
punitive damages.164 Under the interest and policy analysis, it is not
“clearly evident” that either Texas or Oklahoma would be more
seriously impaired if its law were not applied.165
In the end, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not permit an
award of punitive damages because it found that the conflict-of-laws
provisions did not allow for the application of the law of a foreign
jurisdiction under the facts of Arabie.166 Although the Supreme

McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hosp., 65 So. 2d 1218, 1229 (La. 2011)). In the
alternative, the Court reasoned that article 3543 would dictate the application of
Louisiana law if it were to apply. Id. The first paragraph states that issues
pertaining to standards of conduct are governed by the law of the state in which
the injurious conduct occurred. Id. Louisiana law should apply because the most
significant conduct—the refinery spill—occurred in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
166. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 319, 324. The Court mainly relied upon article 3546,
but it noted that articles 3543 and 3547 are also inapplicable in the alternative. Id.
Justice Guidry concurred with the majority on the denial of punitive damages. Id.
at 336 (Guidry, J., concurring). He recognized that punitive damages are not
generally allowed under Louisiana law nor are they allowed under any of
Louisiana’s statutory exceptions based on the facts of Arabie. Id. (citing Bellard v.
American Cent. Ins. Co., 980 So. 2d 654, 667 (La. 2008); Gagnard v. Baldridge,
612 So. 2d 732, 736 (La. 1993)). See supra Part II.A.2. However, he disagreed on
the standard of review for an issue regarding choice-of-law. Id. Rather than
applying a standard of manifest error, as the majority opinion did, Justice Guidry
urged a standard of de novo review for choice-of-law determinations. Id. See
Wooley v. Lucksinger, 61 So. 3d 507, 562−63 (La. 2011); Mihalopoulos v.
Westwind Africa Ltd., 511 So. 2d 771, 775−76 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (“The law is
well settled that a determination of choice of law by the trial court is reviewed by
the appellate courts ‘de novo[.]’” (citing Diaz v. Humboldt, 722 F. 2d 1216 (5th
Cir. 1984)). Nevertheless, Justice Guidry found the award of punitive damages
under article 3546 improper due to legislative policy against punitive damages and
jurisprudential concerns. Arabie, 89 So. 3d at 336 (Guidry, J., concurring). He first
recognized the refusal to award punitive damages as “a fundamental tenet of
Louisiana law.” Id. at 337. Justice Guidry relied upon Ricard v. State, 390 So.2d
882, 884 (La. 1980), for this proposition. Id. This policy was reinforced by the
repeal of article 2315.3, specifically applicable to toxic tort cases. Arabie, 89 So.
3d at 337−38 (Guidry, J., concurring). He then argued that “allow[ing] recovery
under [the] facts [of Arabie], would infer a jurisprudential rule that corporations
headquartered out-of-state can be held vicariously liable through the application of
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Court reached the correct result in Arabie, it left a convoluted,
multifactor interest analysis intact, which leaves room for legislative
action to provide a more predictable choice-of-law analysis for
multistate tort cases involving punitive damages.
Further, three courts analyzed the facts of Arabie before
reaching the correct conclusion on punitive damages. Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court provided an interpretation of the articles
governing choice-of-law in multistate tort conflicts—consistent with
Louisiana’s legislative intent disfavoring the award of punitive
damages—the analysis for future cases is uncertain. The
inconsistency in the interpretation of the conflict-of-laws articles
among Louisiana courts shows the need for legislative clarification
in this area of law to ensure that the code articles are properly
applied in future cases.
Arabie supports the implementation of a specific statutory basis
for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to provide certainty in
future litigation involving corporations conducting business across
multiple jurisdictions so that courts reach consistent results in
multistate tort conflicts and litigation does not require multiple,
time-consuming appeals.
IV. THE DOOR AJAR: BEWARE OF GREEKS BEARING GIFTS
The Louisiana Supreme Court closed the door to punitive
damages in Arabie, but the door has been left ajar for future
plaintiffs to push the limits of the conflict-of-laws articles provided
in the Louisiana Civil Code. The Court reached the correct result in
one case but only increased a plaintiff’s burden of using article 3546
for an award of punitive damages in future cases. Arabie did not,
however, completely close the door to punitive damages by any
means. Through conflicting codal interpretation and clashes in the
another forum’s laws for its Louisiana employees’ tortious acts absent evidence of
management’s participation, consent or control.” Id. Justices Knoll and Johnson
concurred with the majority in part but dissented from the majority opinion on the
reversal of punitive damages. Id. at 324. (Knoll, J., dissenting). Justice Knoll
concurred with the majority’s affirmation of compensatory damages. Id. In Justice
Knoll’s dissent, she agreed with the lower courts and reasoned that CITGO was
domiciled outside of Louisiana and the injurious conduct occurred outside of
Louisiana, therefore satisfying an award of punitive damages by meeting two of
article 3546’s requirements. Id. Interestingly, she pointed out that the choice-oflaw provisions in the Code do not create a presumption that Louisiana law should
apply to suits filed in Louisiana. Id. Regardless of whether there is a presumption
or not, article 3548 and the interpretation of the majority clearly state that CITGO
should be domiciled in Louisiana as a juridical person, which undercuts Justice
Knoll’s conclusion on domicile and the award of punitive damages.
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choice-of-law provisions, there is still an opportunity for courts to
reach different results in future litigation, and courts have already
begun to reach inconsistent results less than a year after the Arabie
decision.
A. The Continuing Challenge: Evans v. TIN, Inc.
Within a month of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in
Arabie, claimants showed that there may still be room to use the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on conflict of laws to permit awards of
punitive damages, contrary to legislative intent. In Evans v. TIN,
Inc.,167 plaintiffs brought suit in federal court under an eerily similar
fact pattern to that in Arabie. The dispute arose after TIN’s paper
mill and waste treatment facility in Bogalusa, Louisiana, discharged
contaminants into the Pearl River, which allegedly caused injury to
property owners, businesses, and individuals.168 Plaintiffs sought
punitive damages under Texas law against TIN for the resulting
injury that occurred in Louisiana under the Louisiana conflict-oflaws articles.169 The plaintiffs argued that two of the requisite three
article 3546 factors authorizing an award for punitive damages
under the law of another state were satisfied: (1) that decisions at
corporate headquarters in Texas constituted the injurious conduct,
rather than conduct at the Louisiana paper mill; and (2) that the
defendant should be domiciled at its principal place of business in
Texas, rather than in Louisiana where the out-of-state corporation
conducted business and incurred the delictual liability.170
In evaluating the defendant’s motion to dismiss the punitive
damages claims, the Evans court extensively analyzed the punitive
damages claims under article 3546 and the corresponding choice-oflaw articles, citing Arabie throughout its analysis.171 The parties did
not dispute that the place of the resulting injury was Louisiana.172 As
for the injurious conduct, the plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged that
corporate-level decisions occurring in Texas outweighed any
tortious activity that occurred locally.”173 The court then applied the
167. Evans v. TIN, Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–2068, 11–2069, 11–2182, 11–2348,
11–2351, 11–2417, 11–2949, 11–2985, 11–2987, 11–3018, 11–3021, 11–3048,
11–3049, 12–18, 11–3050, 2012 WL 1499225 (E.D. La. Apr. 27, 2012).
168. Id. at *1.
169. Id.
170. Id. The plaintiffs attempted to employ federal admiralty law as well,
which failed and resulted in dismissal of their punitive damages claims under that
cause of action. Id. at *3−4.
171. Id. at *5−12.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *7.
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multifactor interest test, as the Louisiana Supreme Court had done in
Arabie,174 to conclude that Texas law may be more seriously
impaired in the matter, which supported treating TIN as a Texas
domiciliary.175 Therefore, the district court concluded that it was too
soon to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages because
(1) the place of the injurious conduct and (2) the place of the
defendant’s domicile should be in Texas, which allows an award of
punitive damages.176
Evans proves not only that parties are already trying to
circumvent the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Arabie but
also that parties may use trial and error to file the identical claim in
federal court that Arabie found to be unsuccessful in state court.177
This sets a dangerous precedent and reopens the door to the Trojan
Horse of punitive damages under Louisiana’s choice-of-law
provisions, which the Legislature needs to close.
B. Slaying the Trojan Horse: A Legislative Solution to the
Inconsistency in Codal Interpretation
The Legislature needs to amend the conflict-of-laws articles to
clarify the analysis for multistate torts involving punitive damages.
In order to close the codal loopholes exposed in the Arabie litigation
and left open in the Evans litigation, the Legislature should focus on
the choice-of-law provisions governing the place of the injurious
conduct and the place of the defendant’s domicile, giving attention
to how plaintiffs can circumvent the current provisions.
1. Striking the “Injurious Conduct” from Article 3546
All three courts in Arabie agreed that the resulting injury
occurred in Louisiana but disagreed as to where the injurious
conduct occurred.178 There is an odd disconnect in the appellate
174. Id.
175. Id. at *12.
176. Id.
177. “The lead case in this consolidated proceeding was the first of 33 cases
filed in various federal and state courts.” Evans v. TIN, Inc., Nos. 11–2067, 11–
2068; 11–2069; 11–2182; 11–2348; 11–2351; 11–2417; 11–2949; 11–2985; 11–
2987; 11–3018; 11–3021; 11–3048; 11–3049; 12–18; 11–3050; 12–2042; 12–
2424; 12–2815; 12–2819; 12–2824; 12–2825; 12–236, 2013 WL 4501061 (E.D.
La. Aug. 21, 2013). The parties engaged in settlement negotiations under the
supervision of a mediator, “and TIN’s insurance carriers reached an agreement to
resolve plaintiff’s claims against” them. Id. “The class action settlement resolved
all claims related to the incident, except for certain ‘later-manifested bodily injury’
claims.” Id.
178. See supra Part III.
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court’s conclusory paragraph where the court said that “but for the
release in 2006, the damages to the plaintiffs would not have
occurred.”179 The court is admitting to “but for” causation of the
plaintiffs’ injuries and contradicting its entire conflict-of-laws
analysis, which argued that the injurious conduct occurred out of
state at headquarters, rather than at the refinery in Louisiana or at
both locations.180 This concession undermines the court’s own
argument and is evidence of judicial unrest in the interpretation of
article 3546’s consideration of injurious conduct when analyzing a
claim for punitive damages in a choice-of-law situation.
The appellate court also contradicted itself by reaffirming that
the resulting injury occurred in Louisiana but stating that the
resulting injury was caused by injurious conduct at the Louisiana
refinery.181 If the appellate court’s determination that malfunctions
at the Louisiana refinery were the only cause of the refinery spill is
taken as true, the appellate court’s finding on this issue is
incongruent with the plaintiffs’ argument and the appellate court’s
ultimate determination that the injurious conduct occurred through
decision-making at CITGO’s corporate headquarters in Oklahoma
and Texas. The court’s finding on the injurious conduct should also
pretermit the punitive damages discussion altogether. If the site of
the injurious conduct is in fact at the refinery in Louisiana, then
there would be no opportunity for punitive damages through
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions because it would be
impossible to meet two of article 3546’s three requirements for the
award of punitive damages, i.e., (1) the place of the resulting injury,
(2) the place of the injurious conduct, or (3) the place of the
defendant’s domicile.182
The Evans court repeated the same contradiction as the lower
courts in Arabie by reasoning that corporate headquarters decisions
in Texas may be the site of the injurious conduct under article 3546,
although the resulting injuries occurred in Louisiana, even after the
Louisiana Supreme Court corrected the same reasoning under the
facts in Arabie.183 There is clear confusion, which requires a
legislative remedy, when three courts have made the same mistake
in the article 3546 analysis of injurious conduct.
179. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 556−57 (La. Ct. App.
2010). This statement was in the context of stating causation occurred in “both
states,” presumably referring to Texas and Oklahoma. Id.
180. Id. See supra Part III.B.
181. See supra Part III.B.
182. The Louisiana Supreme Court properly reached this determination and
corrected the flaw in the lower courts’ reasoning in the article 3546 analyses. See
supra Part III.C.
183. See supra Part IV.A.
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The most logical solution would be to limit article 3546 by
excluding the consideration of injurious conduct because it can be
such a tenuous concept along an indefinite chain of causation. A
delictual action resulting from years of allegedly injurious conduct
lends itself to manipulation of this requirement.184 The injurious
conduct consideration must be stricken from article 3546 to provide
a more predictable basis for awarding punitive damages based on
where the resulting injury occurred and the place of the defendant’s
domicile. Article 3546 should be amended to read as follows:
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this
state unless authorized:
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct
occurred and by either the law of the state where the
resulting injury occurred or the law of the place where
the person whose conduct caused the injury was
domiciled; or
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and
by the law of the state where the person whose conduct
caused the injury was domiciled.185
This revision would remedy the attenuation in the injurious
conduct analysis and prevent the uncertainty in the article 3546
analysis. The analysis currently involves three factors yet only
requires two to be met for an award of punitive damages. Instead of
arguing the weight of corporate headquarters’ decisions made out of
state against the weight of delictual conduct occurring in Louisiana,
the court would only consider two factors: the place of the resulting
injury and the place of the defendant’s domicile, both of which are
subject to less ambiguity. Both factors would be required for an
award of punitive damages under another state’s law, instead of the
three alternative factors that, as the article is currently written, are
subject to manipulation. By striking consideration of the injurious
184. See supra Part III.B.
185. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3546 (2013) (alteration to original). An example of a
defendant’s domicile in a jurisdiction allowing punitive damages that would meet
the revised requirement would be a company transacting unrelated business in
Louisiana but headquartered outside of Louisiana, which would evade jurisdiction
under the proposed version of article 3548. See infra Part IV.B.2. Additionally, a
company transacting business in Louisiana and incurring delictual liability in
Louisiana but headquartered elsewhere, thus evading jurisdiction under the current
version of article 3548, might meet this revised domicile requirement. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3548 (2013). An example of a the resulting injury in a jurisdiction
allowing punitive damages that would meet the revised requirement would be a
long term disease, such as asbestos, or perhaps a legacy lawsuit for environmental
damages in another jurisdiction, which were caused by a company transacting
business in multiple jurisdictions.
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conduct from article 3546, the analysis of future multistate tort cases
would be more predictable on the basis of two clear factors.
2. Striking the “Interest Analysis” from Article 3548
The Arabie courts also had various interpretations of the articles
governing the domicile of parties to multistate tort litigation and
ultimately decided that the two codal provisions could be
harmonized to declare CITGO a Louisiana domiciliary.186 CITGO’s
admission of fault recognized the situs of the injurious conduct to be
at the location of the refinery spill in Louisiana, which proved that
CITGO intended to be domiciled in Louisiana as a juridical person
doing business in Louisiana.187 Furthermore, CITGO’s admission of
fault specified responsibility for “compensatory damages,” with no
mention of punitive damages.188 This also shows that CITGO
understood that it was subject to the law of Louisiana, which did not
permit the award of punitive damages in such a case. As dictated by
the current codal provisions and the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Arabie, CITGO’s expectation to be domiciled in Louisiana as a
corporation conducting business in Louisiana and incurring delictual
liability in Louisiana seems to be the correct result.
Even after Arabie, the Evans court recognized that the choiceof-law domicile provisions could be harmonized. However, the
Evans court still domiciled the defendant–corporation at its principal
place of business in Texas under the Arabie multifactor interest
analysis, rather than in Louisiana where it conducted business and
incurred delictual liability.189 The appellate court in the Arabie
litigation also relied heavily on the multifactor interest analysis to
avoid domiciling CITGO in Louisiana where it conducted business
and incurred delictual liability, which shows there is a recurring
problem involving the domicile provisions in a multistate tort
conflict.190
186. See supra Part III.C.
187. See supra Part III.A.
188. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 534 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
189. See supra Part IV.A.
190. The appellate court became so preoccupied with analyzing comments to
the code articles that it never came to a true conclusion on the second prong of the
article 3542 interest analysis, much less the application of article 3542 itself. The
appellate court bypassed the remaining factors to be considered under the pertinent
contacts prong of article 3542: “the events giving rise to the dispute, including the
place of conduct and injury, the domicile, habitual residence, or place of business
of the parties, and the state in which the relationship, if any, between the parties
was centered.” Art. 3546. The court exhausted the events giving rise to the dispute
but did not address how many of those events actually occurred in Lake Charles,
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Under the current choice-of-law provisions on delictual liability,
article 3548 requires that a corporation conducting business in
Louisiana be domiciled in state with the word “shall.”191 This does
not allow the court to circumvent this requirement, but nonetheless,
courts are relying upon an interest analysis,192 from which the
Louisiana Supreme Court created a multifactor test, to circumvent
the application of article 3548. As article 3548 currently reads, a
court may avoid declaring an out-of-state tortfeasor as a Louisiana
domiciliary if it finds that another state’s interests would be more
seriously impaired by considering the corporation a Louisiana
domiciliary.
The Legislature must prevent judicial reliance on the multifactor
interest analysis to circumvent the codal provisions governing
domicile. To preclude courts from meeting the domicile requirement
of article 3546 on punitive damages and from awarding punitive
damages by domiciling defendants outside of Louisiana, article
3548 should be redacted to strike the interest analysis as a codal
circumvention and mandate that all tortfeasors be domiciled in
Louisiana when a tortfeasor conducted business in Louisiana and

which could also influence the pertinent contacts analysis. The court analyzed the
place of conduct as headquarters but explicitly conceded that the place of injury
was Lake Charles. The Third Circuit determined that CITGO was domiciled at its
headquarters, but this is debatable under a pertinent contacts analysis. The court
failed to note that CITGO was a habitual resident of Louisiana at the situs of its
place of business—the Lake Charles refinery. Most importantly, the appellate
court never discussed the relationships of each state to the parties and the dispute,
as required by the first prong of article 3515. This weighs most heavily in
CITGO’s favor because the plaintiffs only had a relationship with CITGO in Lake
Charles, Louisiana. They were employed in Louisiana, worked in Louisiana, and
were injured by CITGO in Louisiana. CITGO headquarters in Texas never had
any contact with these plaintiffs prior to this litigation. The court never discussed
the adverse consequences of subjecting CITGO to the law of more than one state
under the second prong of article 3515. Article 3543, comment (f), which was
referenced in the opinion but is not even the relevant article, mentioned that “there
is nothing unfair about subjecting a tortfeasor to the law of the state in which he
acted. Having violated the standards of conduct of that state, he should bear the
consequences of such violation and should not be allowed to invoke the lower
standards of another state.” Arabie, 49 So. 3d at 555 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE art.
3543 cmt. f. (2013)). Again, this comment can be viewed in CITGO’s favor. First,
they acted in both Texas and Louisiana. Second, an award of greater damages
should not be characterized as a “higher standard of conduct.” To make a final
interpretation under the article 3542 interest analysis, as the appellate court neither
clarified its reasoning nor made a final conclusion until it simply stated that it
applied, it would be very reasonable to believe both the pertinent contacts and
policy considerations would favor the application of Louisiana law. Id. at 556.
191. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3548 (2013).
192. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
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incurred delictual liability in Louisiana. Article 3548 should be
amended to read as follows:
For the purposes of this Title, and provided it is appropriate
under the principles of Article 3542, a juridical person that is
domiciled outside of this state, but which transacts business
in this state and incurs a delictual or quasi-delictual
obligation arising from activity within this state, shall be
treated as a domiciliary of this state.193
If the Legislature makes this amendment, two goals would be
met: reinforcement of legislative intent and predictability. First,
courts would be bound to domicile out-of-state corporations in
Louisiana if they meet the two codal requirements: (1) conducting
business in Louisiana and (2) incurring a delictual liability in
Louisiana. Article 3458 is weak as it currently reads. Presently,
courts may easily circumvent article 3548 through an unpredictable
multifactor interest analysis. The Legislature promulgated article
3548 as a domicile provision exclusive to multistate torts, in
addition to the general conflict-of-laws domicile provision; if the
Legislature’s true intent was to subject out-of-state tortfeasors to
Louisiana domicile as a means to limit the award of punitive
damages, the consideration of “the principles of Article 3542”
should be stricken from this article to remove this loophole. Second,
amending article 3548 would make a defendant in a multistate tort
suit arising from activity in Louisiana almost certainly a Louisiana
domiciliary, aiding predictability. Legislative intent against punitive
damages and predictability are core tenets of Louisiana’s choice-oflaw codification, and the Legislature should amend article 3458 to
reflect this.
3. Repealing the “Escape Hatch” Under Article 3547
The codal allowance for exceptional cases is inconsistent with
the balance of the conflict-of-laws provisions on multistate torts.
The Civil Code provides seven articles specific to choice-of-law for
delictual obligations.194 Yet, article 3547 allows the court to
circumvent all of these articles to apply the law of another state if it
is “clearly evident . . . that the policies of another state would be
more seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the particular
issue.”195 This can occur if “from the totality of the circumstances of
193.
194.
195.
Article

Art. 3548 (alteration to original).
See id. arts. 3542−3548.
Art. 3547. See supra note 73 for the article 3542 policy considerations.
3547 has its critics. See Russel J. Weintraub, The Contribution of
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an exceptional case,”196 the court reaches that conclusion. Both the
trial court and the appellate court in Arabie refrained from applying
article 3547 to circumvent the more explicit conflict-of-laws articles
governing multistate torts but recognized it as a fallback provision
permitting the award of punitive damages.197 Only the Supreme
Court denied the application of the “escape hatch” as an alternative
method to allow an award of punitive damages under Texas law.198
If the policy analysis dictated by the conflicts codification and
Louisiana’s policy against punitive damages are to be taken
seriously, the Legislature should consider repealing the article 3547
“escape hatch” to provide greater clarity in the conflict-of-laws
articles. As noted by the original opponents of the conflicts
codification, specific policies espoused by the Louisiana Legislature,
like the legislative policy against punitive damages, need to be
safeguarded against circumvention. Article 3547 may be an aid to
the interjection of the perfect Trojan Horse for importing punitive
damages into Louisiana against Louisiana’s legislative policy.
Therefore, article 3547 should be repealed if Louisiana is serious
about restricting awards of punitive damages. Alternatively, the
article could be amended to exclude article 3546 on punitive
damages and read as follows:
The law applicable under Articles 3543−35456 shall not
apply if, from the totality of the circumstances of an
exceptional case, it is clearly evident under the principles of
Article 3542, that the policies of another state would be
more seriously impaired if its law were not applied to the
particular issue. In such event, the law of the other state shall
apply.199
The legislative proposal to either repeal article 3547 or to amend
article 3547 would provide a sufficient solution to prevent courts
from using this “escape hatch” as a loophole to award punitive
damages under another state’s law, even if such an award would not
be permissible under the codal provisions.

Symeonides and Kozyris to Making Choice of Law Predictable and Just: An
Appreciation and Critique, 38 AM. J. COMP. LAW 431, 473 (1990).
196. Art. 3547.
197. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 556 (La. Ct. App.
2010).
198. The Evans court did not rely upon the article 3547 escape hatch as a
primary authorization for punitive damages or as an alternative. See supra Part
IV.A.
199. Art. 3547.
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If the Legislature makes these proposed amendments to the
conflict-of-laws provisions on delictual liability to remedy the
current uncertainty in the punitive damages analysis, future litigants
would benefit from the clarity and predictability provided by the
amendments, and the judiciary would be insulated from unnecessary
litigation regarding the meaning of the choice-of-law articles and the
unpredictable multifactor interest analysis.
C. Lingering Inside the Gates: Policy Concerns from Punitive
Damages
In addition to showing the need for legislative remedies to
correct improper statutory interpretation, Arabie also exposed
overarching policy concerns in the conflicts codification,
specifically forum selection and corporate exposure in relation to
punitive damages claims in multistate torts. Legislative proposals
could effectively rectify these concerns.
1. Jurisdiction Jumping: Federal Versus State Court
An oddity from the very beginning of the Arabie litigation is that
the plaintiffs chose to file suit in Louisiana state court, even though
the plaintiffs continually insisted that the situs of the injurious
conduct was at the defendant’s headquarters and that CITGO should
be domiciled at its headquarters in Texas or Oklahoma. Even though
they had filed suit in state court, the plaintiffs fervently fought for an
award of punitive damages, which is disfavored under Louisiana
law. The plaintiffs could have easily filed suit in federal court under
diversity jurisdiction, a forum in which their path to punitive
damages might have been easier.200 Alternatively, the application of
Texas law in a federal suit would have allowed the award of
punitive damages.201
The reasons that the plaintiffs chose to file suit in Louisiana state
court are clear: the traditional plaintiff preference for state courts
and the avoidance of a jury trial. This jurisdictional jump set the
stage for the entire debate on the place of the defendant’s domicile
and the place of injurious conduct, and it supports the need for
200. It is important to note that a federal court is bound to apply the substantive
law of the state in which the federal action was brought. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). But, filing suit in federal court would arguably yield an easier
policy argument for the award of punitive damages. A federal judge might have a
broader approach to the Louisiana state policy on punitive damages, rather than a
Louisiana state judge who is more in tune with the policy of the state.
201. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 2008).
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amendments to the conflict-of-laws provisions governing punitive
damages.
a. The Traditional Plaintiff Preference for State Courts
Certain factors sometimes steer plaintiffs away from federal
courts, “such as greater federal judicial supervision, a greater
geographical reach of federal jury pools leading to perhaps more
pro-defense panels, and a perceived greater federal enthusiasm for
dismissing cases on summary judgment.”202 The Arabie plaintiffs’
manipulation of these preconceived notions about federal courts
ultimately backfired. The plaintiffs filed suit in state court, although
there was complete diversity between the Louisiana plaintiffs and
CITGO under the plaintiffs’ argument that CITGO should be
domiciled at its headquarters in Texas or Oklahoma. The plaintiffs
prevented removal by declaring damages for each plaintiff under the
requisite amount for a federal diversity action.203 Ironically, the
plaintiffs lost their claim for punitive damages by failing to file in
federal court under Texas law in order to take advantage of Texas’s
punitive damages provisions.204 If the codal provisions governing
domicile in multistate tort cases are amended to strictly treat out-ofstate corporations doing business in Louisiana and incurring
delictual liability in Louisiana as Louisiana domiciliaries, the
defendant–corporation’s domicile would clearly be Louisiana,
which would effectively minimize the opportunity for forum
shopping in claims subject to diversity jurisdiction.
202. Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 (internal citations omitted).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 generally allows defendants to remove a case originally
filed in state court to federal court. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 n.29.
204. “[E]ven a state with a constitutional prohibition on punitive damages must
recognize without question a judgment for punitive damages from another state”
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. Borchers, supra note
23, at 530−31. Texas substantive law applies a “most significant relationship
approach” to conflict of laws, which balances the relative interest of each state in
having its own law applied based on the factors in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, which include: the needs of the interstate and international
systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue; the protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and the
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Am. Home
Assur. Co. v. Safway Steel Products Co., Inc., A Div. of Figgie Intern., Inc., 743
S.W.2d 693, 696−97 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). This is an inherently fact sensitive analysis,
however, the policies of the forum may favor the application of Texas law to the
facts of Arabie in either a Texas forum or if Texas substantive law were applied in
a federal court.
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b. The Avoidance of a Jury Trial
Another irony is the Arabie plaintiffs’ strategy of filing suit in
Louisiana state court to avoid a jury trial. Under Louisiana law, the
threshold for a jury trial in a civil suit is an individual cause of
action worth a minimum of $50,000.205 The appellate court’s
opinion in Arabie specifically stated that “no plaintiff received a
total award exceeding $50,000.00 due to the jurisdictional limits for
a bench trial.”206 A sum in excess of $75,000 is the minimum
amount in controversy required to file a federal diversity action,207
which also happens to be greater than the amount claimed by the
Arabie plaintiffs. This gave the plaintiffs two reasons to keep their
claims under these requisite amounts: (1) to avoid a jury trial and (2)
to avoid removal to federal court.208
Punitive damages were key to the Arabie plaintiffs’ case. It was
a calculated risk to exercise Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions
on punitive damages, but it was arguably less risky than yielding to
Texas law on the issue.

205. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1732 (2013). This threshold amount cannot
be met in the aggregate and is exclusive of interest and costs. Id. A bench trial is
held in claims for any lesser amount. See id. In the 2012 legislative session, House
Bill 343 was proposed to lower the cap for civil jury trials from $50,000 to
$15,000 in tort cases tried in Louisiana state courts, with a focus on personal
injury cases. Bill Barrow, House Committee Rejects Lowering Threshold for Jury
Trials in Lawsuits, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 2, 2012, http://www.nola.com
/politics/index.ssf/2012/04/house_committee_rejects_loweri.html.
206. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 557 (La. Ct. App.
2010). Despite failed efforts of legislative adjustment, Louisiana has the highest
national threshold for a civil jury trial. Louisiana Lawsuit Abuse Watch published
a report asserting that Louisiana’s threshold for civil jury trials is in fact twentyeight times the national average of $1,742.40. Press Release, Louisiana Lawsuit
Abuse Watch, Study Finds LA Jury Trial Threshold More Than 28 Times
National Average (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.llaw.org/release
_030912.html. Even the maximum threshold is $35,000 less than Louisiana’s
threshold. REDUCING ACCESS TO THE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF LOUISIANA’S JURY
TRIAL THRESHOLD, A RESEARCH REPORT BY LOUISIANA LAWSUIT ABUSE WATCH
4 (2012), available at http://www.llaw.org/docs/ReducingAccesstotheCourts
_FINAL.pdf.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). See supra Part IV.A.1.
208. See Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. 2007-2738, 2009 WL
7170890 (La. Dist. Ct. Oct. 22, 2009) (order for an itemization of plaintiffs’
damages).
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2. The Substantive and Procedural Clash: Consequences of
Codal Silence
In addition to forum considerations, there are also policy
concerns over the differences in state substantive and procedural law
that are not always resolved in a choice-of-law analysis under
Louisiana’s codal framework. Although courts are bound to follow
the procedural law of the forum state, the procedural law may be at
odds with another state’s substantive law, especially in multistate
tort cases. The Arabie litigation revealed substantive and procedural
issues involving the classification of punitive damages and the
requisite burden of proof in a punitive damages claim under
Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions.
a. The Classification of the Availability of Punitive Damages
Courts nationwide are split on whether the classification of
punitive damages should be a substantive or procedural issue. Some
courts classify the availability of punitive damages as a procedural
issue and apply the law of the forum, whereas other courts classify
punitive damages as a substantive tort issue.209 The substantive
classification leads to the consideration of the following factors both
singly and jointly: the place of the injurious conduct, the situs of the
plaintiff’s injury, and the defendant’s domicile or principal place of
business.210 These factors mirror those embodied in the Louisiana
Civil Code articles, namely the factors of article 3546 on punitive
damages in a multistate tort conflict.211 This connection lends itself
to the inference that Louisiana courts view the issue of punitive
damages as a substantive issue, therefore requiring consideration of
the article 3546 factors.
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, which limited the
ratio of compensatory and punitive damages,212 could be viewed as
questioning the constitutionality of states imposing punitive
damages “extraterritorially” in states other than where the defendant
acted.213 This idea drawn from State Farm supports weighing the
place of the injurious conduct as the foremost factor under a
209. Borchers, supra note 23, at 531.
210. Id. at 530−31.
211. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3546 (2013).
212. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003);
Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 (citing Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004)).
213. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 531 (citing Campbell, 98 P.3d 409).
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substantive analysis of punitive damages.214 The conflict of laws
would then be resolved by applying the law of the forum where the
injurious conduct occurred. Once again, the consideration of the
classification of punitive damages as substantive or procedural
circles back to the argument in Arabie over whether the place of the
injurious conduct was at corporate headquarters or at the refinery in
Louisiana.
However, the consideration of the place of the injurious conduct
in a substantive analysis of punitive damages creates a loophole,
allowing manipulation of where the injurious conduct occurred,
which is why it might be more predictable to consider the place of
the resulting injury instead. This provides further support for an
amendment to the conflict-of-laws provisions to strike the
consideration of the place of the injurious conduct and to clarify the
analysis, especially because Louisiana law seems to classify punitive
damages as a substantive issue by requiring consideration of these
factors. The classification of the availability of punitive damages
also raises an issue over the classification of the necessity of a jury
trial in a claim for punitive damages, which may be substantive in
some states, yet procedural in others.
b. The Classification of the Necessity of a Jury Trial
In a claim for punitive damages under Texas law, there must be
a unanimous jury on the questions of liability for and the amount of
punitive damages.215 This requirement alone raises a procedural
dilemma in applying Texas substantive law on punitive damages
under Louisiana’s conflict-of-laws provisions in a civil case brought
in Louisiana state court. Louisiana procedural law does not provide
for a jury trial in civil claims worth less than $50,000, yet Louisiana
procedural law governs the award of damages in a Louisiana
forum.216 For this reason, it is impossible to return a unanimous jury
verdict on punitive damages without asserting a claim for
Louisiana’s requisite threshold amount. Thus, the lower court
decisions in Arabie could not have possibly applied Texas
substantive law on punitive damages because the plaintiffs each
asserted claims for less than $50,000. Arguably, the district court
judge and the appellate court judge abused their discretion in
awarding punitive damages under Texas law without a unanimous
jury verdict because such an award conflicts with the black-letter
law. This is the essence of a substantive and procedural clash to
214. See id.
215. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.003(d) (West 2008).
216. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1732 (2013).
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which the current Louisiana conflict-of-laws articles open the door
by allowing the application of potentially incompatible substantive
law under Louisiana procedural provisions. Because of this conflict,
the choice-of-law articles should be amended to further restrict the
award of punitive damages under the law of other states in an effort
to minimize this substantive and procedural clash in future cases.
c. The Classification of the Standard of Proof
Another substantive versus procedural debate arises over how
states classify the standard of proof for an award of punitive
damages. For instance, some states might have a bifurcated
approach of applying the law of the forum to the standard of proof
as a procedural issue but applying another state’s law to the standard
of conduct for the same issue.217 This issue also rose to the forefront
in the Arabie litigation because Louisiana law, which was the law of
the forum, statutorily dictates the requisite standard of liability for
each codal exception allowing punitive damages, which is a
substantive determination based on the tort at issue, but Louisiana
law is silent on the standard of proof for punitive damages in
conflict-of-laws situations. Texas law, on the other hand, allows for
three standards of proof to be considered in the award of punitive
damages, which is a procedural determination. This differentiation
in the standard of proof is yet another weak point in the Louisiana
conflict-of-laws provisions because the provisions do not clearly
reconcile standard of proof issues and open the door to another
state’s procedural law. While amending the codal provisions to
restrict the award of punitive damages under another state’s law may
minimize the issue, it might also be advisable to amend the choiceof-law provisions on punitive damages to explicitly require a
heightened standard of proof, as is required for Louisiana’s statutory
exceptions for punitive damages, as a procedural law of the forum,
which would simultaneously minimize corporate exposure.
3. Corporate Exposure: The Result of Multijurisdictional
Business Transactions
Yet another policy concern raised in Arabie is the exposure that
corporate defendants face in choosing to conduct business in
Louisiana. In Arabie, Justice Knoll alone took note of this very real
economic concern embedded within the conflict-of-laws
provisions.218 The Projet drafters obviously recognized this as a
217. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 531.
218. See supra Part III.C.

368

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

valid point because they provided specific provisions to govern the
domicile of juridical persons incurring delictual liability while
conducting business in Louisiana.219 This policy concern parallels
the other policy concerns embedded throughout the choice-of-law
rules, such as the consideration of pertinent contacts and the situs of
the injurious conduct.
The domicile provisions specific to multistate tort cases should
be viewed as specifically insulating corporations seeking to do
business in Louisiana by allowing them to predict the applicable law
and conduct business accordingly.220 It would certainly be unfair
from a policy standpoint to have subjected CITGO to Texas law on
punitive damages when it clearly anticipated liability for tortious
conduct to be addressed under Louisiana law, as the conflict-of-laws
provisions dictate. As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted, the
plaintiffs were adequately compensated with an award of
compensatory damages, without the need for an award of punitive
damages.221 Application of specific domicile provisions in such
situations is also supported by the policy concern of subjecting
corporate defendants to inconsistent laws of multiple forums, which
the Projet drafters noted as a core reason for the conflicts
codification. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court was correct in
its statutory interpretation of CITGO’s domicile.222 As such, the
codal domicile provisions should be amended to strike policy
considerations and the multifactor interest analysis, as used in
Arabie, as a loophole to domicile corporate defendants out of state.
4. Louisiana’s Purported Policy Against Punitive Damages: The
Contradiction and the Clarification
Perhaps the most important policy concern—made apparent by
the Arabie litigation—is Louisiana’s purported policy against
punitive damages. One could argue, as the lower courts and the
plaintiffs did in Arabie, that Louisiana has no true policy against the
award of punitive damages.223 While scholars may debate the issue,
the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly affirmed the policy and
maintained this civil law tradition in its ultimate decision in
Arabie.224
219. See supra Part II.B.1.
220. See supra Part II.B.1.
221. See supra Part III.C.
222. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3518, 3548 (2013).
223. See supra Parts III.A, B.
224. In Arabie, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “the legislature has
seen fit to authorize punitive damages only in certain specific instances. The fact
that punitive damages are only authorized in particular situations shows that the
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Aside from those specific, statutorily excepted awards of
punitive damages, perhaps the most stunning contradiction in both
the statutory exceptions and the current conflict-of-laws articles is
that there is no cap on the award of punitive damages in
Louisiana.225 This is against the very essence of the idea that
Louisiana has a strict policy against punitive damages, if the
instances in which they are allowed by statutory exception allow
them without limit.
Furthermore, the common law predecessor to this notion and
Louisiana’s common law neighbors leave punitive damages to the
discretion of a jury. Again, Louisiana’s limitation on jury trials
resurfaces as a procedural flaw in leaving the limitless award of
punitive damages to only a judge’s discretion in many cases that
would require a jury trial under the substantive law of other
jurisdictions from which the punitive damages provisions are
imported in a choice-of-law situation. Consequently, this leaves the
award to a judge with little experience in awarding punitive
damages at all, seeing as it is not the normal type of damages
awarded in Louisiana.
In Arabie, the court of appeal blatantly denied Louisiana’s
policy against punitive damages.226 The Louisiana Supreme Court
correctly refuted the appellate court on this assertion and
jurisprudentially affirmed the Legislature’s longstanding intent of
restricting punitive damages in Louisiana, as it did more than 100
years before in Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana.227 There is clear
authority for Louisiana’s longstanding policy against the award of
punitive damages in the limited statutory exceptions for punitive
damages and the recent repeal of article 2315.3. The lower courts’
analyses in Arabie show how easy it could be to grant an award of
punitive damages by importing foreign law under Louisiana’s
current conflict-of-laws provisions. In fact, more cases following the
Arabie plaintiffs’ lead have arisen since this initial challenge under
the choice-of-law provisions. The legislative intent restricting
punitive damages, along with policy concerns, should prevent

State has a general policy against punitive damages.” Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum
Corp., 89 So. 3d 307, 318 n.3 (La. 2012).
225. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 15, at 579. When punitive
damages were introduced in American common law, there was no cap either. Id. at
582 (citing Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009)). Punitive
damages awards were left to the jury’s “‘broad discretion to award damages as
they saw fit.’” Id. (quoting Atl. Sounding Co., 557 U.S. at 409).
226. Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 49 So. 3d 529, 554 (La. Ct. App.
2010). See supra Part III.C.
227. See supra Part II.A.1.
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plaintiffs from circumventing Louisiana punitive damages law by
importing the law of foreign jurisdictions through the Louisiana
Civil Code provisions on conflict of laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Even after the Arabie litigation, the issue of punitive damages is
resurfacing in Louisiana, with history repeating itself. The Louisiana
courts and the Louisiana Legislature have gone back and forth,
overruling each other on the issue of punitive damages over the past
century. The Louisiana Supreme Court refuted the attempts to
import punitive damages without a specific statutory basis in
Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana, more than 100 years ago, just as the
Louisiana Supreme Court recently refuted the attempt to import
punitive damages without a specific statutory basis in Arabie.
Arabie shows the need to implement a specific statutory basis for
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to close the door to punitive
damages and to provide certainty in future litigation involving
corporations conducting business across multiple jurisdictions.
Indeed, the Legislature may be the culprit by promulgating flawed
articles on the conflict of laws and inviting the Trojan Horse of
punitive damages into Louisiana. Therefore, the Legislature should
act to clarify the conflict-of-laws provisions, especially those on
punitive damages in multistate tort conflicts. This would save years of
litigation in a climate of uncertainty for corporate defendants in both
state and federal courts. The Legislature must close the door to
punitive damages and definitively limit the conflict-of-laws articles
governing punitive damages to only allow those strictly limited codal
provisions in accordance with legislative intent.
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